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INTRODUCTION 
Essential reading in media sports portrays how sports has developed as a global, multibil-
lion dollar industry that constitutes significant economic activity (Boyle and Haynes, 2004; 
Horne, 2006; Rowe, 1999; Whannel, 1992). Simultaneously, sports represents a social and 
cultural activity loved and practiced by millions of people across the globe (Coalter, 2007; 
Maguire, 1999). Scholars have widely discussed the role of the media, and television broad-
casting in particular, in the development of sports as a cultural sphere and commercial enter-
prise. On the one hand, sports and television have built a synergetic relationship, one that al-
lows both institutions to reap the fruits from the complementariness of their economic inter-
ests. Along with the expanding footprint of modern capitalism, the transformation of sports 
into a media spectacle has been highly instrumental for commercial players to take a share of 
this lucrative sports market (Andrews, 2003; Gaustad, 2000; Law et al, 2002; Miller et al., 
2001). On the other hand, free-to-air television coverage of sports events, most notably by 
public service broadcasters and terrestrial commercial networks, has helped in creating a pub-
lic sphere and contributed to the formation of national identity and cultural citizenship in 
many countries. Coverage of major sporting events was traditionally seen as a major argu-
ment to legitimise a national broadcasting service, and was of high symbolic value to its ex-
plicit cultural mission (Rowe, 2004; Scherer and Whitson, 2009). 
In the paper, we will examine how these contrasting perspectives on television and sports 
are reflected in the regulation of sports broadcasting. The contrasting perspectives on televi-
sion and sports are each embodied in an extensive policy framework that regulates the eco-
nomic and societal impact of sports broadcasting. First, competition policy aims at facilitating 
free and fair competition in the upstream broadcast market, and ensures that media companies 
and consumers have equal access to sports rights (Iosifidis, 2011; Papadopoulos, 2010). Sec-
ondly, sector-specific media regulation, in casu the listed events regulation, intends to guaran-
tee the public’s right to information and preserve free access to sports events of major im-
portance to society (Evens and Lefever, 2011; Lefever, 2012). However, there is an enduring, 
but until now relatively unsuccessful, pressure on policy makers to relax both of these strands 
of regulation in order to favour private interests in sports broadcasting (Scherer and Sam, 
2012). Hence, concerns arise about the reach and effectiveness of government intervention to 
preserve the highly-valued public as well as private interests of sports broadcasting, and keep 
the balance between the cultural and commercial dimension of sport. 
Based on the findings from eight countries, with a global angle comprising sports broad-
casting markets in Australia, Brazil, India, Italy, South Africa, Spain, United Kingdom and 
the United States (for a full discussion, see Evens et al., 2013), it can be concluded that the 
balance is indeed shifting in favour of the commercial interests of sport multinationals, de-
priving citizens access to free-to-air sports coverage and therefore saddling sports fans with 
rising bills from pay-TV and pay-per-view services. The economic agenda of market regula-
tion and the prominence of market-based arguments raises the concern that the citizen’s inter-
est is becoming marginalised as the consumer discourse becomes more widespread. In as-
sessing the need for policy intervention, we will make a strong argument for a ‘dual regulato-
ry approach’ that seeks to balance the commercial priorities of sports organisations and pri-
vate media firms with the wider social and cultural benefits citizens gain from free-to-air 
sports broadcasting. Hence, we urge national governments as well as supranational regulatory 
bodies, first, to resist pressure from pay-TV consortia and sporting associations to relax or 
abolish existing legislation designed to preserve free-to-air coverage of major events of na-
tional importance; and secondly, to apply the existing competition rules more vigorously and 
with more emphasis on the economic and cultural specificities of the sports broadcasting mar-
kets. 
ASSESSING REGULATORY APPROACHES 
The implementation of the kind of dual regulatory approach described above requires poli-
cy makers and regulators to constantly weigh up the commercial and socio-cultural implica-
tions of their decisions (and non-decisions). Taking a global viewpoint, the regulation of 
sports broadcasting takes on various forms, with far-reaching implications for the balance 
between the cultural and commercial interests of sports. Obviously, to a large degree, these 
different approaches reflect the particular historical, political and cultural traditions of each 
country concerned and echo a tradition of policy intervention in correcting market shortcom-
ings. The type and degree of regulatory intervention within sports broadcasting can usefully 
be seen as a continuum with the ‘free market’ at one end and the ‘excessive regulation’ at the 
other side of the policy spectre. In the free market case, sports broadcasting is totally left to 
the market with no role for public service broadcasting and a ‘light touch’ regulatory frame-
work, which does little to tackle the market power of dominant commercial interests or ensure 
free-to-air television coverage of major sports events. In the excessive regulation case, public 
service (or commercial free-to-air) broadcasters are granted a leading role in sports broadcast-
ing, supported by a regulatory approach that savoury preserves the citizens’ interests by 
means of major events regulation and the vigorous appliance of competition law principles, 
possibly at the detriment of commercial interests in society. 
 
Figure 1: Free market versus excessive regulation 
In reality, of course, most countries fall somewhere between these two extremes and some 
combine an interventionist approach to major events legislation with a less interventionist 
approach to the application of competition law (or vice versa). Hence, the regulation of sports 
broadcasting all over the world often relies on both approaches of policy intervention, and 
echoes a mixture of safeguarding public and private interests. Nevertheless, analysing sports 
broadcasting in different countries in terms of ‘free market’ versus ‘excessive regulation’ pro-
vides a good starting point for comparative analysis. In that context, Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the policy model in each of the eight countries considered in the study, and shows 
the different regulatory approaches to sports broadcasting. Based on that, we have identified 
three policy models in global sports broadcasting. The consequence of each policy model is 
that it may produce structural imbalances between the cultural and commercial interests of 
sports broadcasting, and tends to favour one of these forces over the other. 
Let the market rule 
Broadly speaking, sports broadcasting in the US, Brazil, Spain and South Africa can be 
characterised as predominantly market-driven. In each of these countries, there is no (or only, 
in the case of Spain and South Africa, fairly weak) major events legislation and the regulatory 
impact of competition law has been minimal (although this could be debated in the US case). 
Whereas in Brazil the commercial media system was first highly controlled and used as a 
propaganda instrument by political elites, deregulation has been key in the US broadcast 
model since its inception in the 1930s (Sinclair, 1999). Today, the relaxation of media regula-
tion in the US has produced a concentrated system that is controlled by a few conglomerates 
that have spread their wings over the networked media industry. First, public service broad-
casting PBS became soon overpowered by commercial networks in the bidding process for 
popular sports rights. Secondly, multichannel operators and sports leagues have contested the 
anti-siphoning law, which was breaching the US Constitution according to a ruling of the 
Court of Appeals (Wolohan, 2009). Despite these developments, free-to-air broadcasting con-
tinues to play a leading role in the production and consumption of sports broadcasting in the 
US. Third, the Sherman Antitrust Act has hardly been applied in the case of sports broadcast-
ing, but the regulatory agency FCC successfully serves as a ‘big stick’ to limit anti-
competitive behaviour by broadcasters and pay-TV operators, especially with regard to re-
gional sports networks (Moss, 2008). This became most prominent in the case of premium 
offering MLB Network whose access was severely restricted as a result of an exclusive 
agreement with DirecTV. After the FCC threatened with regulatory intervention, MLB less-
ened its exclusive reliance on DirecTV and allowed access to alternative distributors. Howev-
er, the migration of live sports to league-owned premium packages, enabled by the introduc-
tion of digital television, could serve as the prime trigger for future policy intervention in the 
US broadcast market. 
The US competition approach starkly contrasts with the one applied in Brazil, which has a 
relatively weak tradition of competition law. Economic arguments rather than socio-cultural 
goals drive the process of media policymaking in Brazil. The (late) availability of a competi-
tion law framework has failed to restrict economic power of the reigning media empires and 
has not prevented TV Globo from retaining its dominant position in media and broadcasting 
(Fox and Waisbord, 2002). Despite Globo’s high market share and considerable degree of 
corporate integration, competition agency CADE only recently accused TV Globo of abusing 
dominant position and ruled that the broadcaster needs to share top domestic and international 
soccer rights with alternative broadcasters. The absence of anti-siphoning law has, however, 
not resulted into a migration of live sports to pay-TV channels so far, partly because of the 
high costs associated with subscription services. But since a prosperous middleclass is likely 
to emerge soon following the booming economy in the country, the penetration of pay-TV is 
likely to rise in the next years. The conclusion that large parts of the Brazil population, espe-
cially lower classes and people residing in rural areas, will be deprived access from live sports 
could urge the need for media-specific regulation to guarantee free-to-air sports coverage. In 
this context, the new progressive government has taken some modest steps in the democrati-
sation of the media landscape (Matos, 2011). Government enhanced the establishment of a 
national public service broadcaster, which is to promote cultural citizenship and guarantee 
diversity in the market. Following pressure from civil society, government has also debated 
the introduction of a media regulatory framework to better serve public interests in the Brazil-
ian media market. Despite good intentions, however, installing such regulatory framework 
remains the biggest challenge for the Brazilian media landscape. 
Australian ‘Schemes’ 
By contrast, Australia, and to a lesser extent India, could be well seen to provide examples 
of ‘excessive regulation’, due to the particular forms of major events legislation adopted in 
each country. The ‘Schemes’ in Australia may harm private interests in the sports, and possi-
bly favour free-to-air broadcasting in a disproportionate manner. The anti-siphoning approach 
in Australia and India is fundamentally different to that operated in Europe (cf. infra). The 
Australian and Indian schemes are based on a ‘first choice’ approach, which prioritises free-
to-air broadcasters in the purchase of broadcast rights, and possibly creates a competitive im-
balance between free-to-air broadcasters and pay-TV operators. Since public broadcasters and 
commercial free-to-air channels are entitled the first right to bid, the regulation is said to limit 
rivalry in the sports rights market and, hence, reduce the economic value of sports rights 
(Healey, 2009). Hence, the conclusion that the sports rights market in Australia is severely 
underdeveloped (in economic value) in comparison with similar countries all over the world 
comes as no surprise.  
Although it attempts to preserve the public interests, however, the anti-siphoning regula-
tion in Australia has not automatically served the citizen’s interests and safeguarded cultural 
citizenship (Perrine, 2001). In some cases, free-to-air networks have resold sports rights to 
pay-TV operators with profit. In other cases, free-to-air networks bargain cheap deals and 
warehouse the rights, so as to prevent pay-TV operators from obtaining the rights. The ques-
tion thus arises whether a more equitable and effective means of guaranteeing free-to-air 
sports coverage is to preclude free-to-air broadcasters and pay-TV operators from negotiating 
rights contracts that exclude the other form of broadcasting. Another remedy could be to limit 
the extensive amount of listed sporting events and transfer more ‘major’ sporting events to 
subscription services. This would possibly benefit the amount of live sports effectively of-
fered to the Australian viewer. Whether this would also imply a significant increase in the 
fees paid for acquiring sports rights still needs to be seen. The relatively low prices for rugby 
league and rugby union deals as well as the outcome of the Super League and C7 cases might 
be symptomatic of the highly concentrated pay-TV market and in casu Foxtel’s quasi-
monopoly, and may therefore require a more vigorous implementation of the existing compe-
tition policy framework to induce competitive bidding for sports rights (Papandrea, 2006). 
European ‘dual rights’ approach 
The EU anti-siphoning regulation, based on a ‘dual rights’ system, offers a more balanced 
approach, as it allows broadcast rights to listed events to be purchased  by either free-to-air or 
pay-TV broadcasters, but not broadcast exclusively on pay-TV, unless there is no interest in 
providing coverage of an event by a free-to-air broadcaster. In recent years, sporting associa-
tions such as UEFA and FIFA have unsuccessfully contested anti-siphoning regulations be-
cause they fear the listed events mechanism prevents them from maximising broadcasting 
revenues. The fact that only nine European member states have agreed to draw up a list of 
‘protected’ events, implies that the regulation is not applied in large parts of Europe (Lefever, 
2012). So far, Spain has not adopted this kind of listed events regulation and has indeed wit-
nessed a move of live sports from public service broadcaster TVE to pay-TV operators Gol T 
and Canal+. But as Spanish media law requires that at least one match per week of the Pri-
mera División must be shown live on free-to-air networks, Spanish viewers are not automati-
cally deprived from free live sports. In fact, Spanish football clubs benefit from the scarcity 
that is created in the market (in terms of higher rights fees) and free-to-air broadcasters draw 
huge ratings for these matches. 
In those countries that have adopted the major events scheme, however, the regulation is 
therefore not automatically strictly applied. Across Europe, the digitisation of television has 
enabled a shift of sports coverage from free-to-air television to the ‘basic’ packages (as op-
posed to premium packages) of cable and satellite operators. More often than not, viewers 
need to pay subscription fees for accessing such digital-only sports channels (Evens and Lefe-
ver, 2013). As a result, opponents have repeatedly questioned the further value of such regula-
tion and consider it ‘old-fashioned’ in a digital media environment that is characterised by 
disruptive technological change and plenty of new opportunities for viewers to watch (and 
pay for) sports programming. According to the critics, the underlying principles of media-
specific regulation, i.e. spectrum scarcity and the one-way broadcast model, can no longer be 
upheld (e.g. Levy, 2001). However, we will argue in the remaining sections that in a digital 
television industry, where direct payment for popular programming is likely to become com-
mon practice, watering down existing regulation is not the right answer. Although the UK and 
Italy could be well seen to occupy positions somewhere close to equally between the free 
market and excessive regulation extremes, the vigorous application of competition law, com-
plementing a media-specific regulatory framework, is required to achieve a truly balanced 
approach to the regulation of sports broadcasting. 
 A BALANCED APPROACH TO SPORTS BROADCASTING REGULATION 
We believe such a balance between public and private interests in the regulation of sports 
broadcasting would increase both the economic value and the cultural significance of sports, 
and thus maximise total value in society. Critics might argue that the preservation of cultural 
and commercial interests of sports broadcasting are two separate, mutually exclusive policy 
goals, we tend to see them as highly complementary though. The public and private interests 
of sports constantly interact, and have a dialectic relationship, even in the case of the free-
market approach and excess regulation. A change in the conditions of selling, buying and ex-
ploiting sports rights due to technological or regulatory developments directly affects sports 
viewers in terms of lower (higher) subscription prices, or in a more restricted (wider) availa-
bility of sports programming. Similarly, the implementation of listed events regulation could 
under particular conditions have an effect on whether pay-TV broadcasters are allowed to 
enter the bidding process and hence immediately affect the economic value of the sports 
rights. Put simply: changes related to the cultural sphere of sports imply changes for the 
commercial interests of sports, and vice versa. Indeed, the sports media system should be seen 
as a complex web of interdependencies between the various stakeholders of the game. Be-
cause the economic and cultural dimensions of sports broadcasting are highly interrelated, 
policymakers cannot but consider the implications of the competition policy framework on 
the availability of sports programming to the viewers, and simultaneously investigate the con-
sequences of media-specific regulation for sports organisations and broadcasters. Therefore, 
we would like to make a plea for a balanced approach towards sports broadcasting regulation. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that a balanced regulatory approach can be suc-
cessfully applied in practice. For example, regulatory intervention by the European Commis-
sion to limit the scope and duration of exclusive licensing has not prevented European foot-
ball clubs to see a spectacular increase in their earnings from broadcasting rights. Ever since 
the Bundesliga (2003) and Premier League (2006) cases, imposing the unbundling of rights 
packages and limiting the duration of exclusive dealing to three years, the respective football 
associations, helped by the entrance of new delivery platforms and technology, have wit-
nessed a steep increase in rights revenue. In 2012, Sky Deutschland renewed its rights deal for 
the Bundesliga, paying an average of €485.7 million per season from the 2013/14 onwards, 
compared to the average €249 million under the previous contract. Despite Ofcom’s attempt 
to regulate Sky’s excessive market power in the UK, in 2012, the Premier League sold domes-
tic TV rights to Sky and BT for £3 billion, an overall £1.3 billion price increase on the previ-
ous deal. Fears that policy intervention reducing the impact of exclusive dealing would nega-
tively affect the value of sports rights auctions – transferring less money to sports associations 
to invest in the quality of the game – have thus proved unfounded. Similarly, opponents of 
anti-siphoning regulation claim that it enables free-to-air, and especially public service, 
broadcasters to purchase the rights to key sporting events and competitions at artificially low 
prices and thus deprives sports organisations of vital funds. Furthermore, it is claimed that 
free-to-air and especially public service broadcasters are granted relatively cheap access to 
events of major importance to society, and entitled to play an leading role in sports broadcast-
ing. To some extent at least, this may well be the case, but major events legislation has cer-
tainly not prevented an escalation in the value of the television rights to many major events, 
such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup, that have been safeguarded for free-to-
air coverage. 
One could criticise the market-driven approach of US broadcasting for its lack of anti-
siphoning law, but the US model also provides some interesting findings for sports organisa-
tions all over the world. It shows that increased exposure and higher viewership via free-to-air 
television adds to the popularity of sports which maximises the interests of teams, leagues, 
broadcasters, advertisers, sponsors and viewers alike. For sporting organisations, the free-to-
air model allows to diversify their income and lessen reliance on income from pay-TV ser-
vices. The Super League saga, the memorable fight between Foxtel and Optus to control the 
Australian pay-TV market, learned that sports rights owners may not be too greedy and that 
leaving the free-to-air television model could have tremendous impact on the economic value 
of sports rights despite the quick financial gain in the short term. After Sky Sports obtained 
the UK rugby league contract in 1996, audiences fell drastically as a result of which the rec-
ord deal of £87 million had to be renegotiated to £45 million. Hence, the unbridled migration 
from free-to-air television to pay-TV services might, in first instance, add value for sports 
rights owners, but could turn out to be counterproductive in the longer term. In Europe, the 
high levels of TV income – up to 60 per cent in Italy – may impose managerial risks for con-
temporary sports organisations. In Spain, hit by a severe financial crisis, several broadcasters 
have announced they can no longer afford to pay the expensive rights fees demanded by 
Spanish football clubs. This could have dire ramifications for the competitive balance, possi-
bly increasing the financial chaos Spanish football clubs are in for the moment.  
Increasingly, sports associations, both in the US and Europe, tend to abandon exclusive 
rights deals and shift toward non-exclusive licensing models. In the past, exclusive rights 
agreements were seen as the most effective instrument to protect the economic value of 
broadcasting rights for sports leagues, and to maximise the profitability of the broadcasters. 
Now, concerns have arisen about the negative effects such exclusive contracts produce for the 
viewers and alternative pay-TV operators. Consequently, competition authorities have inter-
vened in order to reduce artificial entry barriers in pay-TV markets, and have limited – or in 
some cases banned – exclusive dealing. Apart from regulatory concerns, the advent of broad-
band platforms is completely revolutionising the landscape for access to content and, hence, 
forms an additional challenge for sports associations that are selling media rights. As a result 
of these developments, sports rights owners have started exploring innovative, non-exclusive 
models for selling and exploiting rights. In the US, the major leagues have established their 
own sports channels like NFL Network and NBA TV, and closed carriage agreements with 
multiple distributors. More and more, these initiatives are copied by European sports associa-
tions that want to lessen their reliance on pay-TV operators. Such non-exclusive distribution 
strategies might create opportunities for alternative operators that now have access to sports 
programming. Viewers are no longer forced to choose a particular platform and are free to 
pick the pay-TV operator of their choice. Since all pay-TV operators would have equal access 
to sports programming, increased competition in the market might lower subscription fees and 
spur total penetration of pay-TV services. 
A DUAL REGULATORY APPROACH TO SPORTS BROADCASTING 
A dual regulatory approach to sports broadcasting combines the application of competition 
law, with media-specific regulation, namely major events legislation. Competition law has 
been widely applied in the context of sports broadcasting, and has had a significant impact on 
market conditions for the buying, selling and exploiting of sports media rights. Most notably, 
in both the Us and Europe, regulatory authorities have allowed sports organisations to sell 
their broadcast rights collectively (e.g. as leagues, rather than as individual teams). At least 
partly as a result, the sports rights market has become a ‘seller’s market’ characterised by an 
escalation in the price paid by broadcasters for key rights. With the exception of the US, free-
to-air broadcasters have been generally outbid by pay-TV operators in the contest for sports 
rights, who, in turn, have used exclusive rights deals to establish dominant positions within 
national broadcasting markets. To a greater or lesser degree, the sports rights market has 
evolved into a two-tier system, whereby subscription services secure the most valuable rights 
and free-to-air broadcasters are left with the rights to less popular sports and/or sporting 
events, with the exception of rights protected for free-to-air coverage via major events legisla-
tion. Against the backdrop of the rising costs of sports rights, competition policy should be 
used to stimulate free and fair competition in the sports rights market and ensure that broad-
casters have equal access to key rights. Most importantly, regulatory intervention should be 
used to lessen the common practice of agreeing exclusive rights deals, which tend to restrict 
competition. 
Furthermore, competition law should be used to ensure a reasonable balance between pro-
moting investment and enhancing competition within the sports broadcasting market. To date, 
policy makers and regulators have placed too much emphasis on preserving the investments 
of pay-TV operators in both infrastructure and programming, and have failed to effectively 
tackle the market power of dominant pay-TV operators in many countries. Economies of scale 
and prevailing rights agreements have effectively prevented the emergence of rival operators 
into the pay-TV market and as a result competition has stalled. In response, regulators should 
act to limit the power of leading pay-TV operators, reduce entry barriers and create incentives 
for alternative operators. The combination of collective selling cartels at the supply side and a 
monopolised pay-TV market concentrates significant market power in the hands of leading 
sports organisations and dominant pay-TV broadcasters.  Monopolies at various stages of the 
sports broadcasting supply chain can produce double marginalisation problems and consider-
able mark-up pricing; sports organisations as well as pay-TV operators have pricing power 
and hence keep prices artificially high. As a result, the stricter application of existing behav-
ioural regulation and the increased involvement of competition authorities are required to re-
duce the market power of incumbent pay-TV broadcasters (and powerful sports organisa-
tions). Ultimately, the reward for regulatory intervention along these lines could prove to be 
lower retail prices for consumers. 
Competition policy – based on extensive economic analysis and the assessment of signifi-
cant market power – has, following the US model, emerged as key feature of broadcasting 
regulation in Europe and beyond. However, there is a danger that the increased focus on the 
economic analysis of broadcasting markets, accompanied by the related more general shift 
towards so-called ‘evidence-based policy making’, can lead to a neglect of the wider social 
and cultural significance of broadcasting. For example, despite the best efforts of some econ-
omists (and policy makers), economic concepts cannot fully capture the democratic and cul-
tural role played by public service broadcasting in many European countries. At least partly as 
a result, even the more rigorous application of competition law is unlikely to guarantee the 
achievement of key social and/or cultural policy objectives related to sports broadcasting. 
Specifically, the application of competition law to the sports broadcasting market cannot 
guarantee that major national and international sporting events are provided on free-to-air 
television. To achieve this policy objective, and to enhance cultural citizenship, requires a 
clearly defined and coherent form of major events legislation. In this regard, the EU’s ap-
proach based on the application of clear and transparent criteria for the listing of events offers 
a model approach. At the same time, however, in countries where major events legislation is 
already in place, policy makers should resist calls from pay-TV broadcasters and some sports 
organisations to reduce its scope and effectiveness. For other countries, if live television cov-
erage of major sports events is predominately the preserve of pay-TV, major events legisla-
tion offers an effective means to remedy the situation. 
In a digital media environment that is gradually characterised by audience fragmentation, 
live sports on free-to-air television can be effectively protected by adequate sector-specific 
regulation. It should be stressed that, despite the much hyped new media revolution, including 
the development of Internet television, social media, mobile communication devices and so 
on, television continues to provide an unrivalled capacity to bring viewers together for a 
shared viewing experience. Both in terms of audience preference and (as a result) as a source 
of revenue for sports organisations, television continues to be by far the most significant me-
dium for the coverage of sports events, and it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. 
By complementing the appropriate application of competition law to the sports broadcasting 
market with a clear and coherent approach to major events legislation policy makers can serve 
the interests of broadcasters, sports organisations and citizens. 
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